Abstract On the grounds of two unique features of land, locational specificity and capacity for betterment through in-situ entrepreneurial transformation, this monograph uses three real world examples to qualify Coase’s idea, mentioned in two of his works on the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), that a state monopoly of land is undesirable for allocating land due to the huge transaction costs of non-price allocation. These two features of land enable the creation of institutional arrangements constraining such costs occasioned by rent-seeking or rent dissipation envisaged by Coase. Breaking new theoretical grounds in understanding planning beyond a matter of property rights assignment and attenuation, the three examples show that where the state has an effective monopoly of land supply, it does not behave like a private land monopoly but, subject to constrained rent-seeking, enables, and also possibly brings about the betterment of land and its redistribution by government planning. The examples, two of which testify to a Coase Theorem predicated on Coase’s first work on the FCC, also shed light on the question of property boundaries as an ex ante planning tool for de jure property or an ex post outcome of development. The monograph shows that the transaction costs of both dividing and recombining tradable land, as physically unitized into land parcels within a layout, are greater than partitioning and re-partitioning marketable segments of radio frequencies.

中文翻译：

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科斯土地垄断模型的重新解读：区位特殊性和土地作为法律上和事实上的财产的改善潜力

摘要 基于土地的两个独特特征、位置特殊性和通过原地创业转型改善的能力，本专着使用三个现实世界的例子来证明科斯在他在联邦通信委员会 (FCC) 的两部著作中提到的想法。 ，由于非价格分配的巨大交易成本，国家对土地的垄断是不可取的。土地的这两个特征使得制度安排的产生能够限制科斯设想的寻租或租金消散所引起的成本。这三个例子打破了理解规划的新理论基础，超越了产权分配和衰减的问题，这三个例子表明，在国家有效垄断土地供应的情况下，它的行为不像私人土地垄断，而是：受制于受制于寻租，通过政府规划能够并可能带来土地的改善及其重新分配。这些例子中的两个证明了以科斯在 FCC 上的第一项工作为基础的科斯定理，也阐明了作为法理财产的事前规划工具或事后发展结果的财产边界问题。该专着表明，分割和重组可交易土地的交易成本（在布局内物理组合成地块）高于分割和重新分割无线电频率的可销售部分。其中两个证明了以科斯在 FCC 上的第一项工作为基础的科斯定理，也阐明了作为法律上财产的事前规划工具或发展的事后结果的财产边界问题。该专着表明，分割和重组可交易土地的交易成本（在布局内物理组合成地块）高于分割和重新分割无线电频率的可销售部分。其中两个证明了以科斯在 FCC 上的第一项工作为基础的科斯定理，也阐明了作为法律上财产的事前规划工具或发展的事后结果的财产边界问题。该专着表明，分割和重组可交易土地的交易成本（在布局内物理组合成地块）高于分割和重新分割无线电频率的可销售部分。