In the policy sciences, the intractability of disputes in natural resource governance is commonly explained in terms of a “devil shift” between rival policy coalitions. In a devil shift, policy actors overestimate the power of their opponents and exaggerate the differences between their own and their opponents’ policy beliefs. While the devil shift is widely recognized in policy research, knowledge of its causes and solutions remains limited. Drawing insights from the advocacy coalition framework and social identity theory, we empirically explore beliefs and social identity as two potential drivers of the devil shift. Next, we investigate the potential of collaborative venues to decrease the devil shift over time. These assumptions are tested through statistical analyses of longitudinal survey data targeting actors involved in three policy subsystems within Swedish large carnivore management. Our evidence shows, first, that the devil shift is more pronounced if coalitions are defined by shared beliefs rather than by shared identity. Second, our study shows that participation in collaborative venues does not reduce the devil shift over time. We end by proposing methodological and theoretical steps to advance knowledge of the devil shift in contested policy subsystems.

中文翻译：

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瑞典食肉动物管理政策中的信仰、社会认同和反对者的观点

在政策科学中，自然资源治理中争端的棘手性通常被解释为对立政策联盟之间的“魔鬼转移”。在魔鬼转变中，政策行动者高估了对手的力量，并夸大了自己和对手政策信念之间的差异。尽管政策研究中普遍认识到魔鬼转变，但对其原因和解决方案的了解仍然有限。从倡导联盟框架和社会认同理论中汲取见解，我们根据经验探索信仰和社会认同是魔鬼转变的两个潜在驱动因素。接下来，我们调查了协作场所随着时间的推移减少魔鬼转移的潜力。这些假设通过对瑞典大型食肉动物管理中三个政策子系统中涉及的参与者的纵向调查数据的统计分析进行了测试。我们的证据首先表明，如果联盟是由共同的信念而不是共同的身份定义的，那么魔鬼的转变会更加明显。其次，我们的研究表明，参与协作场所并不会随着时间的推移减少魔鬼转移。我们最后提出了方法论和理论步骤，以推进对有争议的政策子系统中的魔鬼转变的了解。我们的研究表明，参与协作场所并不会随着时间的推移减少魔鬼的转变。我们最后提出了方法论和理论步骤，以推进对有争议的政策子系统中的魔鬼转变的了解。我们的研究表明，参与协作场所并不会随着时间的推移减少魔鬼的转变。我们最后提出了方法论和理论步骤，以推进对有争议的政策子系统中的魔鬼转变的了解。