This paper shows that we can properly analyze Kim Jong-un's survival strategy by employing the knowledge accumulated in comparative studies of contemporary authoritarianism. According to Geddes et al.'s classification, North Korea belongs to a hybrid type that possesses the characteristics of the personalist and single-party types. Recent comparative studies demonstrate that personalist rulers who are not convinced of their firm control of the military tend to hesitate to strengthen it, even though they know that the military is the most effective tool for controlling threats by political elites and the general public. This theoretically explains why the young ruler who experienced a short power succession period did not continue his father's “military-first policy,” and his divide-and-rule approach is inevitably different from his father's. Accordingly, we expect that the ruler of the unconsolidated regime will target the core of the military, the army faction, and utilize security forces as typical personalist rulers do. These are supported in practice. We also observe that Kim Jong-un controls the military by utilizing the organizations of the institutionalized party, the Korean Workers' Party, and appointing party officers to key posts in the military. This positively affects his regime stability, which distinguishes his regime from the pure personalist type.

中文翻译：

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从比较威权视角分析金正恩的生存战略

本文表明，我们可以通过运用当代威权主义比较研究中积累的知识来正确分析金正恩的生存策略。根据 Geddes 等人的分类，朝鲜属于混合型，具有个人主义和一党型的特征。最近的比较研究表明，不相信自己牢牢控制军队的个人主义统治者往往不愿加强军队，即使他们知道军队是控制政治精英和公众威胁的最有效工具。这从理论上解释了为什么经历了短暂权力继承期的年轻统治者没有继续他父亲的“军事优先政策，”而他的分而治之的做法，难免与他父亲的不同。据此，我们预计，松散政权的统治者将像典型的个人主义统治者一样，以军队核心、军队派系为目标，利用安全力量。这些在实践中得到支持。我们还观察到，金正恩通过利用制度化的政党朝鲜劳动党的组织以及任命党的官员担任军队的关键职位来控制军队。这对他的政权稳定性产生了积极的影响，这使他的政权与纯粹的个人主义类型区别开来。我们还观察到，金正恩通过利用制度化的政党朝鲜劳动党的组织以及任命党的官员担任军队的关键职位来控制军队。这对他的政权稳定性产生了积极的影响，这使他的政权与纯粹的个人主义类型区别开来。我们还观察到，金正恩通过利用制度化的政党朝鲜劳动党的组织以及任命党的官员担任军队的关键职位来控制军队。这对他的政权稳定性产生了积极的影响，这使他的政权与纯粹的个人主义类型区别开来。