A brain-computer interface (BCI) designed to restore motor function detects neural activity related to intended movement and thereby enables a person to control an external device, for example, a robotic limb, or even their own body. It would seem legitimate, therefore, to describe a BCI as a system that translates thought into action. This paper argues that present BCI-mediated behavior fails to meet the conditions of intentional physical action as proposed by causal and non-causal theories of action. First, according to the causal theory of action physical actions are bodily movements that are causally related to a person’s intentions. It can be argued, however, that the proximate cause of action in present BCI-mediated behavior is not the person’s intention, and that the behavior fails to meet the conditions of reliability, sensitivity and difference-making. Second, BCI-mediated behavior can be accommodated by a Volitionist account of action if we can equate imagining movement with trying to move. The argument presented is that the novelty, and limited functionality and sensory feedback of present BCIs challenges this equation.

旨在恢复运动功能的脑机接口 (BCI) 可检测与预期运动相关的神经活动，从而使人能够控制外部设备，例如机器人肢体，甚至是他们自己的身体。因此，将 BCI 描述为将思想转化为行动的系统似乎是合理的。本文认为，目前的 BCI 介导的行为不符合因果和非因果行为理论所提出的有意身体行为的条件。首先，根据动作因果理论，身体动作是与人的意图有因果关系的身体动作。然而，可以争辩说，当前 BCI 介导的行为中的近因不是该人的意图，并且该行为不符合可靠性条件，敏感性和差异化。其次，如果我们能够将想象运动等同于试图运动，那么 BCI 介导的行为可以被意志主义的行动描述所适应。提出的论点是，当前 BCI 的新颖性、有限的功能和感官反馈挑战了这个等式。