A central question in the current neurolegal and neuroethical literature is how brain-reading technologies could contribute to criminal justice. Some of these technologies have already been deployed within different criminal justice systems in Europe, including Slovenia, Italy, England and Wales, and the Netherlands, typically to determine guilt, legal responsibility, or recidivism risk. In this regard, the question arises whether brain-reading could permissibly be used against the person's will. To provide adequate legal protection from such non-consensual brain-reading in the European legal context, ethicists have called for the recognition of a novel fundamental legal right to mental privacy. In this paper, we explore whether these ethical calls for recognising a novel legal right to mental privacy are necessary in the European context. We argue that a right to mental privacy could be derived from, or at least developed within in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, and that introducing an additional fundamental right to protect against (forensic) brain-reading is not necessary. What is required, however, is a specification of the implications of existing rights for particular neurotechnologies and purposes.

当前神经法律和神经伦理文献中的一个核心问题是读脑技术如何为刑事司法做出贡献。其中一些技术已经在欧洲不同的刑事司法系统中部署，包括斯洛文尼亚、意大利、英格兰和威尔士以及荷兰，通常用于确定有罪、法律责任或累犯风险。在这方面，出现了一个问题：是否可以在违背个人意愿的情况下使用读脑技术。为了在欧洲法律背景下提供充分的法律保护，防止此类未经同意的大脑读取，伦理学家呼吁承认精神隐私这一新颖的基本法律权利。在本文中，我们探讨了在欧洲背景下这些承认精神隐私新合法权利的伦理呼吁是否必要。我们认为，精神隐私权可以源自欧洲人权法院的判例，或者至少在欧洲人权法院的判例中发展起来，并且没有必要引入一项额外的基本权利来防止（法医）大脑读取。然而，我们需要的是现有权利对特定神经技术和目的的影响的具体说明。