Debates concerning whether Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) mitigates responsibility often involve recourse to its genetic and neurodevelopmental etiology. For such arguments, individuals with ADHD have diminished self-control, and hence do not fully satisfy the control condition for responsibility, when there is a genetic or neurodevelopmental etiology for this diminished capacity. In this article, I argue that the role of genetic and neurobiological explanations has been overstated in evaluations of responsibility. While ADHD has genetic and neurobiological causes, rather than embrace the essentialistic notion that it directly diminishes self-control and, therefore, responsibility, we ought to think of ADHD as constraining only some self-control practices. In particular, situational self-control strategies remain feasible for people with ADHD. However, not all individuals have access to these strategies. I suggest a way to evaluate responsibility in terms of situational rather than agential pleas, which tracks whether the individual had access to self-control behaviors. While I restrict my discussion to ADHD, the access-based approach is also relevant for assessments of responsibility for other cases where self-control failures are at stake.

关于注意力缺陷/多动障碍 (ADHD) 是否减轻责任的争论通常涉及求助于其遗传和神经发育病因。对于这些论点，当这种能力减弱存在遗传或神经发育病因时，患有多动症的个体的自我控制能力减弱，因此不能完全满足责任的控制条件。在本文中，我认为遗传和神经生物学解释在责任评估中的作用被夸大了。虽然 ADHD 有遗传和神经生物学原因，但我们不应接受它直接削弱自我控制并因此削弱责任的本质主义观念，我们应该将 ADHD 视为仅限制某些自我控制实践。特别是，情境自我控制策略对于多动症患者仍然可行。然而，并不是所有的人都有访问这些策略。我提出了一种根据情境而不是代理请求来评估责任的方法，它可以跟踪个人是否可以进行自我控制行为。虽然我将讨论限制在多动症上，但基于访问的方法也适用于对其他涉及自我控制失败的案例的责任评估。