当前位置: X-MOL 学术Neuroethics › 论文详情
Our official English website, www.x-mol.net, welcomes your feedback! (Note: you will need to create a separate account there.)
A Dilemma For Neurodiversity
Neuroethics ( IF 2.6 ) Pub Date : 2020-04-02 , DOI: 10.1007/s12152-020-09431-x
Kenneth Shields , David Beversdorf

One way to determine whether a mental condition should be considered a disorder is to first give necessary and sufficient conditions for something to be a disorder and then see if it meets these conditions. But this approach has been criticized for begging normative questions. Concerning autism (and other conditions), a neurodiversity movement has arisen with essentially two aims: (1) advocate for the rights and interests of individuals with autism, and (2) de-pathologize autism. We argue that denying autism’s disorder status could undermine autism’s exculpatory role in cases where individuals with autism are charged with a crime. Our argument raises a dilemma for the neurodiversity movement: advocating for the rights and interests of individuals with autism may require viewing autism as a condition that can be inherently disabling (at least for some individuals). If this is right, autism’s disorder status might be maintained (again, at least for some individuals) without deriving this result from any general account of disorder.



中文翻译:

神经多样性的困境

确定某种精神状况是否应被视为障碍的一种方法是首先给出使某事成为障碍的必要和充分条件,然后查看它是否满足这些条件。但这种方法因提出规范性问题而受到批评。关于自闭症(和其他疾病),神经多样性运动它的出现主要有两个目的:(1)倡导自闭症患者的权益,以及(2)消除自闭症的病态。我们认为,在自闭症患者被指控犯罪的情况下,否认自闭症的障碍状态可能会削弱自闭症的开脱罪责作用。我们的论点使神经多样性运动陷入两难境地:倡导自闭症患者的权利和利益可能需要将自闭症视为一种可能导致天生残疾的状况(至少对某些人而言)。如果这是正确的,自闭症的障碍状态可能会保持(再次,至少对某些人而言),而不会从任何对障碍的一般解释中得出这个结果。

更新日期:2020-04-02
down
wechat
bug