The attribution of moral responsibility to self-deceivers is a problematic issue. All accounts of self-deception (SD) acknowledge that the faulty beliefformation process is not under the direct and conscious control of the agent. And according to a common and traditional view of responsibility, it is questionable whether agents are properly responsible for actions out of their own control. The attribution of responsibility to self-deceivers, however, is crucial if one is interested in looking at the practice of SD in the social and political domain. Suppose, for example, that a government becomes self-deceptively convinced that, country is under an imminent nuclear threat by a terrorist group and, on the basis of this belief, carries out a preventive attack on the country that it presumes harbors the terrorist group, with great harmful consequences. If it were the case that no proper responsibility could be attributed to self-deceivers, then SD would turn out to be irrelevant in political and social analysis. In this case, being self-deceived would be actually conflated with being mistaken. Whether mistakes are motivated or not does not significantly change their consideration in social and political analysis. The issue of responsibility is therefore paramount for the possibility of making use of SD as a political and social category. How to face this issue depends on two intertwining factors: the first is the view of SD and the second is the conception of responsibility. Concerning the first, I shall adopt a view of SD which is intermediate between the two main approaches present in the debate: the intentional account and the causal account. The intentional account considers SD as the product of the subject’s intentional strategy, although brought about in a nontransparent fashion, while the causal account views SD as caused by cognitive biases triggered by the subject’s motivational state. I hold instead that even though the product of SD, the deceptive belief, is unintentional, the process of belief formation is basically intentional; more precisely, I view SD as a byproduct of intentional steps of the subject elsewhere directed, after the model of invisible hand explanation. I cannot here properly discuss the invisible hand view of SD, and its advantages over either the intentionalist or the causal-motivationist models. For the present argument on responsibility, the relevant and specific feature of the invisible hand model is the conjunction of the unintentionality of outcome with the intentionality of the

中文翻译：

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责任归咎于自欺欺人

将道德责任归于自我欺骗者是一个有问题的问题。自欺欺人（SD）的所有描述都承认错误的信念形成过程不受代理人的直接和有意识的控制。并且根据一种常见的传统责任观，代理人是否对自己无法控制的行为负有适当的责任是值得怀疑的。然而，如果一个人有兴趣研究社会和政治领域的可持续发展实践，那么将责任归属于自欺欺人的人是至关重要的。例如，假设一个政府自欺欺人地相信该国正面临恐怖组织迫在眉睫的核威胁，并基于这种信念对它认为窝藏该恐怖组织的国家进行预防性袭击, 带来极大的有害后果。如果不能将适当的责任归于自我欺骗者，那么 SD 在政治和社会分析中将变得无关紧要。在这种情况下，自欺欺人实际上会与误会混为一谈。错误是否出于动机并没有显着改变他们在社会和政治分析中的考虑。因此，责任问题对于利用可持续发展作为政治和社会类别的可能性至关重要。如何面对这个问题取决于两个相互交织的因素：一是可持续发展的观点，二是责任观念。关于第一个，我将采用介于辩论中存在的两种主要方法之间的 SD 观点：有意解释和因果解释。有意解释认为 SD 是主体有意策略的产物，尽管是以不透明的方式带来的，而因果解释则认为 SD 是由主体的动机状态引发的认知偏差引起的。相反，我认为即使 SD 的产物，欺骗性信念是无意的，但信念形成的过程基本上是有意的；更准确地说，我认为 SD 是在隐形手解释模型之后，在别处定向的主题的有意步骤的副产品。我在这里无法正确讨论 SD 的无形手观，以及它相对于意向主义或因果动机模型的优势。对于目前关于责任的争论，