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The Beneficiary Pays Principle and Luck Egalitarianism
Journal of Social Philosophy ( IF 1.1 ) Pub Date : 2016-09-01 , DOI: 10.1111/josp.12154
Robert Huseby

According to the Beneficiary Pays Principle an agent who, even innocently, benefits from an injustice may have a special duty to compensate the victim of that injustice. According to Luck Egalitarianism, it is unjust if someone is worse off than others, through no fault or choice of her own. These two principles differ widely, both in extension and justification, but tend nevertheless to yield similar conclusions in many cases. One reason is that, typically, the beneficiary and the victim of an injustice become better and worse off through no fault or choice of their own. This paper outlines some of the relevant differences between the two principles, and asks which of the two is intuitively more plausible. The conclusion is that Luck Egalitarianism is clearly more plausible than the Beneficiary Pays Principle. In light of this, the paper examines some further theoretical defenses of the Beneficiary Pays Principle, and finds them unsuccessful.

中文翻译:

受益人支付原则和运气平等主义

根据受益人支付原则,即使是无辜地从不公正中受益的代理人也可能有特殊的义务来补偿这种不公正的受害者。根据运气平等主义,如果某人的境遇比其他人更糟,而并非由于她自己的过错或选择,那是不公正的。这两个原则在外延和证明上都有很大不同,但在许多情况下往往会得出相似的结论。一个原因是,通常情况下,受益者和不公正的受害者的境遇变得越来越好,并不是由于他们自己的过错或选择。本文概述了这两个原则之间的一些相关差异,并询问这两个原则中哪一个在直觉上更合理。结论是,运气均等主义显然比受益人支付原则更合理。有鉴于此,
更新日期:2016-09-01
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