In this article, I introduce and defend what I call the “subject mode account” of collective intentionality. I propose to understand collectives from joint attention dyads over small informal groups of various types to organizations, institutions and political entities such as nation-states, in terms of their self-awareness. On the subject mode account, the self-consciousness of such collectives is constitutive for their being. More precisely, their self-representation as subjects of joint theoretical and practical positions toward the world—rather than as objects of such positions—makes them what they are. Members of such collectives represent each other as co-subjects of such positions and thus represent the world from the point of view of the collective. I will try to show how this account applies at different levels of collective intentionality and how it is preferable to its rivals at each level. At the preconceptual level of joint attention and action, our co-attenders are not what we attend to. They are not the objects of attention, but rather who we attend with. Analogously, at the conceptual level of joint beliefs, intentions, desires, and so on, collectivity is not a matter of what we believe about others and what we intend with regard to them, but who we believe and intend things with. Finally, at the institutional or organizational level, where individuals and groups function in formal roles such as being a manager or a committee, these roles do not, as some philosophers, notably John Searle (1995, 2010), have suggested, exist because people believe that they exist. The primary, collective-constituting intentional phenomena are not beliefs about these roles, but people viewing the world from the vantage point of these roles—and other roles defined relative to them—in a self-aware way, in what I will call “role mode.” For example, a head of a corporation may be aware of giving an order as chairwoman, or committee members of making a recommendation as a committee. It has become standard to distinguish three main philosophical approaches to collective intentionality: content, subject, and mode approaches (Schweikard and Schmid 2013). According to the content approach, collective intentionality can be understood in terms of the content of intentional states, where that content, in the context of the received understanding of propositional attitudes, is taken to be what is believed, intended, and so on. On this perspective, the bestknown representative of which is Michael Bratman (1992, 2014), the we of joint

中文翻译：

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共同主体意识构成集体

在这篇文章中，我介绍并捍卫我所谓的集体意向性的“主体模式帐户”。我建议从自我意识的角度来理解集体，从对各种类型的小型非正式团体的共同关注二人组到组织、机构和政治实体，如民族国家。从主体模式的角度来看，这些集体的自我意识是他们存在的构成要素。更准确地说，他们作为对世界的联合理论和实践立场的主体——而不是作为这些立场的对象——的自我表征使他们成为他们自己。此类集体的成员彼此代表为此类职位的共同主体，因此从集体的角度代表世界。我将尝试展示这个解释如何适用于不同层次的集体意向，以及它在每个层次上如何优于其竞争对手。在共同关注和行动的概念前层面，我们的共同参与者不是我们所关注的。他们不是关注的对象，而是我们和谁一起参加。类似地，在共同信念、意图、愿望等的概念层面上，集体不是我们对他人的看法以及我们对他们的意图的问题，而是我们相信并打算与谁一起做的事情。最后，在制度或组织层面，个人和团体扮演正式角色，例如担任经理或委员会，但这些角色并不像一些哲学家，特别是约翰·塞尔（John Searle，1995 年，2010 年）所暗示的那样存在，因为人们相信它们存在。首要的，集体构成的意向现象不是对这些角色的信念，而是人们从这些角色以及其他与它们相关定义的角色的有利位置以自我意识的方式观察世界，我称之为“角色模式”。例如，一家公司的负责人可能知道作为主席下达命令，或作为委员会提出建议的委员会成员。区分集体意向性的三种主要哲学方法已成为标准：内容方法、主题方法和模式方法（Schweikard 和 Schmid 2013）。根据内容方法，集体意向性可以根据意向状态的内容来理解，其中，在对命题态度的公认理解的上下文中，该内容被认为是所相信的、意图的等等。从这个角度来说，