When, if ever, are restrictions on immigration morally justified? There is considerable disagreement about this foundational question in the political philosophy of immigration, with the debate often framed as a dispute between two camps that each seek to vindicate a putative right. Populating the first camp are defenders of open borders, who defend a “right to immigrate,” or a “human right” to immigrate and “move freely across borders.” Populating the other camp are those who support a receiving state’s “right to exclude,” “right to control [its] borders,” or “right to choose an admissions policy.” This article aims to answer the question at the heart of this debate by clarifying the conditions for immigration restrictions to be justified. I begin in Sections II and III by challenging the debate’s current binary framing, which submerges three important distinctions: specifically, the distinction between individual rights to free immigration and rights to immigrate for specific reasons; the distinction between strong and weak individual rights to immigrate; and the distinction between a receiving state’s legitimacy-right and justificationright to regulate and restrict immigration. In Sections IV and V, I consider the view that individuals have a strong right to free immigration; since a right of this type stringently protects individuals’ freedom to immigrate according to their choice, it would make immigration restrictions normally unjust. I offer a conditional argument that there is no such right. This argument is conditional because it takes for granted an internationalist conception of global justice that differentiates between egalitarian duties of justice that specially apply among those who share membership in a state, and distinct duties of justice that apply between states or among all human persons. I target in particular two arguments that each seek to mount a freestanding case for a strong individual right to free immigration—that is, a case that does not depend on accepting either internationalism or its rival, globalism. While rejecting a strong right to free immigration, I affirm two distinct rights to immigrate: strong rights to immigrate for certain specifically protected reasons, and a weak right to free immigration that establishes a presumption against immigration restrictions that lack a sufficient justification. In Section VI, I then specify the conditions for immigration restrictions to successfully rebut

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移民权利和移民限制的理由

如果有的话，什么时候限制移民在道德上是合理的？关于移民政治哲学中的这个基本问题存在相当大的分歧，辩论经常被描述为两个阵营之间的争端，每个阵营都试图证明一项假定的权利。第一个阵营是开放边界的捍卫者，他们捍卫“移民的权利”，或移民和“自由跨越边界”的“人权”。另一个阵营是那些支持接收国“排除权”、“控制[其]边界的权利”或“选择录取政策的权利”的人。本文旨在通过澄清移民限制的合理条件来回答这场辩论的核心问题。我在第二节和第三节开始挑战辩论当前的二元框架，它掩盖了三个重要的区别：具体而言，个人自由移民权利与出于特定原因移民的权利之间的区别；个人移民权利的强弱区别；以及接收国管制和限制移民的合法性权利和正当性权利之间的区别。在第四部分和第五部分，我认为个人有很强的自由移民权利；由于此类权利严格保护个人根据自己的选择移民的自由，因此通常会使移民限制变得不公正。我提供了一个有条件的论证，即没有这样的权利。这个论点是有条件的，因为它理所当然地认为全球正义的国际主义概念区分了特别适用于共享一个国家成员的那些人的平等主义正义义务，以及适用于国家之间或所有人之间的不同正义义务。我特别针对两个论点，每个论点都试图为强大的个人自由移民权利提出一个独立的案例——也就是说，一个不依赖于接受国际主义或其竞争对手全球主义的案例。在拒绝强烈的自由移民权利的同时，我肯定了两种不同的移民权利：出于某些特别受保护的原因而移民的强烈权利，以及建立一种反对缺乏充分理由的移民限制的推定的弱移民权利。