Using the staggered adoption of universal demand (UD) laws in the United States, we show that the reduction in shareholder litigation risk deteriorates firms’ stock price informativeness. This reduction in stock price informativeness is due to firms changing the way they invest rather than obfuscating or withholding firm-specific information. We also show that the reduction in litigation risk is associated with higher investment-price sensitivity. Overall, despite causing a deterioration in firms’ information environment, the reduction in litigation risk does not appear to harm shareholder wealth. Our paper offers novel insights into the net economic benefits of shareholder litigation laws.

通过在美国交错采用普遍需求 (UD) 法，我们表明股东诉讼风险的降低会降低公司的股价信息量。股价信息量的减少是由于公司改变了他们的投资方式，而不是混淆或隐瞒公司特定的信息。我们还表明，诉讼风险的降低与更高的投资价格敏感性有关。总体而言，尽管导致公司信息环境恶化，但诉讼风险的降低似乎并未损害股东财富。我们的论文对股东诉讼法的净经济效益提供了新颖的见解。