Whether an inversion is associated with weaker firm governance is an open empirical question. While many inversions happen to countries that offer weaker protection to minority shareholders than the U.S., most firms that invert continue to be treated by the SEC as an “U.S. issuer”, and thus, their shareholders benefit from the full protection offered by the U.S. Federal Securities Laws. Our analysis shows that firms that invert exhibit an increase in their stock illiquidity, information asymmetries, and a decrease in their institutional shareholdings, indicating a weaker market-based governance following the inversion. Executives also receive a smaller proportion of equity-based compensation and their wealth is less sensitive to stock prices following the inversion. Thus, despite enjoying the full protection of federal securities laws, investors perceive inverted firms to have weaker governance relative to comparable U.S. firms.

倒置是否与较弱的公司治理相关联是一个开放的经验性问题。虽然向美国少数股东提供的保护较弱的国家发生了许多倒置，但大多数倒置的公司仍被美国证券交易委员会视为“美国发行人”，因此，其股东可以从美国联邦提供的全面保护中受益证券法。我们的分析表明，反向投资的公司的股票流动性增加，信息不对称以及机构持股量的减少，表明反向投资后基于市场的治理较弱。高管们还获得了较少的股权激励，他们的财富在反转后对股票价格不那么敏感。因此，尽管享有联邦证券法的全面保护，