International political outcomes are deeply shaped by the balance of power, but some military capabilities rely on secrecy to be effective. These “clandestine capabilities” pose problems for converting military advantages into political gains. If clandestine capabilities are revealed, adversaries may be able to take steps that attenuate the advantages they are supposed to provide. On the other hand, if these capabilities are not revealed, then adversaries will be unaware of, and unimpressed by, the real balance of power. Most of the existing literature emphasizes that states have few incentives to signal their clandestine capabilities. This conclusion deserves qualification: the condition of long-term peacetime competition can make signaling a profitable decision. Within this context, two important variables help determine whether a state will signal or conceal its secret capabilities: the uniqueness of the capability and the anticipated responsiveness of the adversary. An extended case study of Cold War strategic antisubmarine warfare confirms these predictions.

中文翻译：

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隐瞒还是显露？在和平时期的竞争中管理秘密军事能力

国际政治结果深受权力平衡的影响，但一些军事能力依赖保密才能发挥作用。这些“秘密能力”给将军事优势转化为政治收益带来了问题。如果秘密能力被揭露，对手可能能够采取措施削弱他们应该提供的优势。另一方面，如果这些能力没有被揭示出来，那么对手就不会意识到真正的力量平衡，也不会被真正的力量平衡所打动。大多数现有文献都强调，国家很少有动力表明其秘密能力。这个结论值得肯定：长期的和平时期竞争条件可以使信号成为有利可图的决定。在此背景下，两个重要变量有助于确定一个国家是否会发出信号或隐藏其秘密能力：能力的独特性和对手的预期响应能力。冷战战略反潜战的扩展案例研究证实了这些预测。