Promoting the rule of law in Afghanistan has been a major U.S. foreign policy objective since the collapse of the Taliban regime in late 2001. Policymakers invested heavily in building a modern democratic state bound by the rule of law as a means to consolidate a liberal post-conflict order. Eventually, justice-sector support also became a cornerstone of counterinsurgency efforts against the reconstituted Taliban. Yet a systematic analysis of the major U.S.-backed initiatives from 2004 to 2014 finds that assistance was consistently based on dubious assumptions and questionable strategic choices. These programs failed to advance the rule of law even as spending increased dramatically during President Barack Obama's administration. Aid helped enable rent seeking and a culture of impunity among Afghan state officials. Despite widespread claims to the contrary, rule-of-law initiatives did not bolster counterinsurgency efforts. The U.S. experience in Afghanistan highlights that effective rule-of-law aid cannot be merely technocratic. To have a reasonable prospect of success, rule-of-law promotion efforts must engage with the local foundations of legitimate legal order, which are often rooted in nonstate authority, and enjoy the support of credible domestic partners, including high-level state officials.

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为什么美国在阿富汗促进法治的努力失败了

自 2001 年底塔利班政权垮台以来，促进阿富汗法治一直是美国外交政策的主要目标。决策者投入巨资建设一个受法治约束的现代民主国家，以此作为巩固自由后冲突顺序。最终，司法部门的支持也成为打击重组塔利班的平叛努力的基石。然而，对 2004 年至 2014 年美国支持的主要举措的系统分析发现，援助始终基于可疑的假设和有问题的战略选择。这些计划未能推进法治，即使在巴拉克奥巴马总统执政期间支出急剧增加。援助有助于在阿富汗国家官员中促成寻租和有罪不罚的文化。尽管普遍存在相反的说法，但法治举措并没有支持反叛乱的努力。美国在阿富汗的经验表明，有效的法治援助不能仅仅是技术官僚主义的。为了获得合理的成功前景，法治促进工作必须与合法法律秩序的地方基础打交道，这些基础通常植根于非国家权威，并得到可靠的国内合作伙伴的支持，包括国家高级官员。