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Bullets for Ballots: Electoral Participation Provisions and Enduring Peace after Civil Conflict
International Security ( IF 4.8 ) Pub Date : 2017-04-01 , DOI: 10.1162/isec_a_00275
Aila M. Matanock

Why does fighting recur following some civil conflict peace settlements, but not others? What kind of agreements are associated with more enduring peace? Post-conflict elections can often complicate and even undermine peace agreements. Agreements that contain “electoral participation provisions,” however, may help stabilize settlements and produce more enduring peace. Electoral participation provisions mandate that rebel groups be allowed to compete alongside the government in post-conflict elections. Such provisions encourage external actors, such as intergovernmental organizations and foreign donors, to become engaged in post-conflict elections. As part of this engagement, they can provide incentives to the parties to adhere to the terms of the settlement, as well as detect and sanction instances of noncompliance. New cross-national data suggest that conflict after peace settlements recurs less often when electoral participation provisions are included than when they are not. The data also suggest that this pacifying relationship holds when combatants expect international engagement.

中文翻译:

选票要点:选举参与条款与民事冲突后的持久和平

为什么在一些内战和平解决后会再次发生战斗,而其他的不会?什么样的协议与更持久的和平有关?冲突后选举往往会使和平协议复杂化甚至破坏。然而,包含“选举参与条款”的协议可能有助于稳定定居点并产生更持久的和平。选举参与条款规定允许叛乱团体在冲突后选举中与政府竞争。这些条款鼓励外部行为者,例如政府间组织和外国捐助者,参与冲突后选举。作为这种参与的一部分,他们可以激励各方遵守和解条款,以及发现和制裁不合规的情况。新的跨国数据表明,在纳入选举参与条款的情况下,和平解决后冲突再次发生的频率低于未纳入的情况。数据还表明,当战斗人员期望国际参与时,这种安抚关系成立。
更新日期:2017-04-01
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