Is India shifting to a nuclear counterforce strategy? Continued aggression by Pakistan against India, enabled by Islamabad's nuclear strategy and India's inability to counter it, has prompted the leadership in Delhi to explore more flexible preemptive counterforce options in an attempt to reestablish deterrence. Increasingly, Indian officials are advancing the logic of counterforce targeting, and they have begun to lay out exceptions to India's long-standing no-first-use policy to potentially allow for the preemptive use of nuclear weapons. Simultaneously, India has been acquiring the components that its military would need to launch counterforce strikes. These include a growing number of accurate and responsive nuclear delivery systems, an array of surveillance platforms, and sophisticated missile defenses. Executing a counterforce strike against Pakistan, however, would be exceptionally difficult. Moreover, Pakistan's response to the mere fear that India might be pursuing a counterforce option could generate a dangerous regional arms race and crisis instability. A cycle of escalation would have significant implications not only for South Asia, but also for the broader nuclear landscape if other regional powers were similarly seduced by the temptations of nuclear counterforce.

中文翻译：

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印度的反力量诱惑：战略困境、原则和能力

印度是否正在转向核反击战略？由于伊斯兰堡的核战略和印度无力反击，巴基斯坦对印度的持续侵略促使德里领导层探索更灵活的先发制人的反击选择，以试图重新建立威慑。越来越多的印度官员正在推进反击瞄准的逻辑，并且他们已经开始为印度长期以来的不首先使用政策制定例外，以可能允许先发制人使用核武器。与此同时，印度一直在采购其军队发动反击所需的部件。其中包括越来越多的准确和响应迅速的核运载系统、一系列监视平台和复杂的导弹防御系统。然而，对巴基斯坦实施反击行动将异常困难。此外，仅仅担心印度可能会采取反制措施，巴基斯坦的反应可能会引发危险的地区军备竞赛和危机不稳定。如果其他地区大国同样受到核反制力量的诱惑，那么升级循环不仅会对南亚产生重大影响，还会对更广泛的核格局产生重大影响。