States frequently employ overt and covert foreign-imposed regime change (FIRC) to pursue their foreign policy interests. Yet there is little scholarship on the question of whether FIRCs improve relations between the states involved. In fact, most FIRCs either fail to reduce—or increase—the likelihood of militarized disputes between interveners and targets. Fundamentally, FIRC entails a principal-agent problem: foreign-imposed leaders rule over states with interests different from those of the intervener. Whereas the intervening state wants the new leader to pursue policies that reflect its interests, once in power, such leaders are focused on ensuring their political survival, a task that is often undermined by implementing the intervener's agenda. Foreign-imposed leaders who carry out the intervener's desired policies attract the ire of domestic actors. These domestic opponents can force the regime to reverse course or may even remove it from power in favor of leaders who are hostile to the intervener; in both cases, the result can be renewed conflict with the intervener. Rwanda's replacement of Mobutu Sese Seko with Laurent-Désiré Kabila in Zaire illustrates this problem.

中文翻译：

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你不能总是得到你想要的：为什么外国强加的政权更迭很少改善州际关系

各国经常采用公开和隐蔽的外国强加政权更迭 (FIRC) 来追求其外交政策利益。然而，关于 FIRC 是否改善有关国家之间的关系这一问题几乎没有学术研究。事实上，大多数 FIRC 要么未能减少或增加干预者与目标之间发生军事化争端的可能性。从根本上说，FIRC 涉及一个委托代理问题：外国领导人统治的国家的利益与干预者的利益不同。虽然干预国家希望新领导人奉行反映其利益的政策，但一旦掌权，这些领导人就会专注于确保他们的政治生存，而这一任务往往会因实施干预者的议程而受到破坏。实施干预的外国领导人” 其理想的政策引起了国内行为者的愤怒。这些国内反对者可以迫使政权改变方向，甚至可能将其下台，转而支持对干预者怀有敌意的领导人；在这两种情况下，结果都可能与干预者重新发生冲突。卢旺达在扎伊尔用 Laurent-Désiré Kabila 取代蒙博托·塞塞·塞科就说明了这个问题。