Nuclear deterrence rests on the survivability of nuclear arsenals. For much of the nuclear age, “counterforce” disarming attacks—those aimed at eliminating an opponent's nuclear forces—were nearly impossible because of the ability of potential victims to hide and protect their weapons. Technological developments, however, are eroding this foundation of nuclear deterrence. Advances rooted in the computer revolution have made nuclear forces around the world considerably more vulnerable. Specifically, two key approaches that countries have relied on to ensure arsenal survivability since the dawn of the nuclear age—hardening and concealment—have been undercut by leaps in weapons accuracy and a revolution in remote sensing. Various methods, evidence, and models demonstrate the emergence of new possibilities for counterforce disarming strikes. In short, the task of securing nuclear arsenals against attack is far more difficult than it was in the past. The new era of counterforce challenges the basis for confidence in contemporary deterrence stability, raises critical issues for national and international security policy, and sheds light on one of the enduring theoretical puzzles of the nuclear era: why international security competition has endured in the shadow of the nuclear revolution.

中文翻译：

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反力量新时代：技术变革与核威慑的未来

核威慑取决于核武库的生存能力。在核时代的大部分时间里，由于潜在受害者有能力隐藏和保护他们的武器，因此旨在消除对手核力量的“反力量”解除武装攻击几乎是不可能的。然而，技术发展正在侵蚀核威慑的这一基础。植根于计算机革命的进步使世界各地的核力量变得更加脆弱。具体而言，自核时代开始以来，各国为确保武库生存能力所依赖的两种关键方法——强化和隐蔽——已被武器精度的飞跃和遥感革命所削弱。各种方法、证据和模型证明了反击解除武装打击的新可能性的出现。简而言之，确保核武库免受攻击的任务比过去困难得多。反力量的新时代挑战了当代威慑稳定的信心基础，提出了国家和国际安全政策的关键问题，并揭示了核时代持久的理论难题之一：为什么国际安全竞争一直在核革命。