The 1994 Agreed Framework called for North Korea to dismantle its plutonium-production complex in exchange for civilian light water reactors (LWRs) and the promise of political normalization with the United States. The accord succeeded at rolling back North Korea's nuclear program, but the regime secretly began enriching uranium when the LWR project fell behind schedule. Today, scholars look back at the Agreed Framework as a U.S. offer of “carrots” to bribe the regime, but this framing overlooks the credibility challenges of normalization and the distinctive technical challenges of building LWRs in North Korea. A combiniation of political and technical analysis reveals how the LWR project helped build credibility for the political changes promised in the Agreed Framework. Under this interpretation, the LWR project created a platform for important breakthroughs in U.S.-North Korean engagement by signaling a U.S. commitment to normalization, but its signaling function was undercut when the United States displaced the costs of LWR construction to its allies. The real challenge of proliferation crisis diplomacy is not to bribe or coerce target states into giving up nuclear weapons, but to credibly signal a U.S. commitment to the long-term political changes needed to make denuclearization possible.

中文翻译：

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其他方式正常化——朝鲜核危机中的技术基础设施和政治承诺

1994 年的框架协议要求朝鲜拆除其钚生产综合体，以换取民用轻水反应堆 (LWR) 和与美国实现政治正常化的承诺。该协议成功地阻止了朝鲜的核计划，但当 LWR 项目落后于计划时，该政权秘密开始浓缩铀。今天，学者们将协议框架视为美国提供的贿赂政权的“胡萝卜”，但这种框架忽略了正常化的可信度挑战以及在朝鲜建造轻水堆的独特技术挑战。政治和技术分析的结合揭示了 LWR 项目如何帮助为商定框架中承诺的政治变革建立可信度。在这种解释下，轻水堆项目通过发出美国对正常化的承诺，为美朝接触的重要突破创造了一个平台，但当美国将轻水堆建设的成本转移给其盟友时，它的信号功能被削弱了。扩散危机外交的真正挑战不是贿赂或胁迫目标国家放弃核武器，而是以可信的方式表明美国对实现无核化所需的长期政治变革的承诺。