The advent of cyber warfare exacerbates the risk of inadvertent nuclear escalation in a conventional conflict. In theory, cyber espionage and cyberattacks could enhance one state's ability to undermine another's nuclear deterrent. Regardless of how effective such operations might prove in practice, fear of them could generate escalatory “use-‘em-before-you-lose-‘em” pressures. Additionally, cyber threats could create three qualitatively new mechanisms by which a nuclear-armed state might incorrectly conclude that its nuclear deterrent was under attack. First, cyber espionage could be mistaken for a cyberattack. Second, malware could accidentally spread from systems that supported non-nuclear operations to nuclear-related systems. Third, an operation carried out by a third party could be misattributed by one state in a bilateral confrontation to its opponent. Two approaches to risk reduction are potentially viable in the short term: unilateral restraint in conducting potentially escalatory cyber operations, and bilateral or multilateral behavioral norms.

中文翻译：

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网络战和无意升级

网络战争的到来加剧了常规冲突中无意中核升级的风险。从理论上讲，网络间谍和网络攻击可以增强一个国家破坏另一国的核威慑力的能力。不管这种操作在实践中可能证明多么有效，对它们的恐惧都可能产生不断升级的“在失去它们之前先使用它们”的压力。此外，网络威胁可能会在质量上创造出三种新机制，据此，一个核武国家可能会错误地得出其核威慑力量受到攻击的结论。首先，网络间谍活动可能被误认为是网络攻击。其次，恶意软件可能会意外地从支持非核操作的系统传播到与核相关的系统。第三，一个国家在双边对抗中可能将第三者的行动错误地归咎于其对手。短期内有两种降低风险的方法可能可行：单方面限制进行潜在升级的网络运营，以及双边或多边行为规范。