The 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (tpnw) represents a daring act of self-empowerment: nuclear have-nots produced an international disarmament treaty without the involvement of the nuclear-weapon states or their allies. In this essay, we assess how the new treaty relates to the existing nuclear order and its four central norms: constraints on use, political restraint, non-proliferation, and disarmament. We discuss the tpnw's origin in and impact on this contested order. At the heart of contestation are two security concepts: deterrence versus the immediate ban of nuclear arms, which result in fundamentally different ideas on how to pursue the road to “global zero.” Whether or not the tpnw and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons are compatible depends on how the opponents handle their controversies. The key is to overcome the emotionalized polarization and rediscover a common basis in order to prevent damage to the existing nuclear order and bring forward nuclear disarmament in practice.

中文翻译：

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没有核武器国家的核裁军：《禁止核武器条约》

2017年的《禁止核武器条约》（tpnw）代表了一项大胆的自我授权行为：没有核武器的国家在没有核武器国家或其盟国参与的情况下产生了国际裁军条约。在本文中，我们评估了新条约如何与现有的核秩序及其四个核心规范相关：使用限制，政治约束，不扩散和裁军。我们讨论了tpnw的由来及其对这一有争议秩序的影响。竞争的核心是两个安全概念：威慑与立即禁止核武器，这导致了关于如何走上“全球零”之路的根本看法。tpnw与《不扩散核武器条约》是否兼容，取决于反对者如何处理其争议。