Government officials exert tremendous power when they buy goods and services from private companies. By setting the terms and conditions under which public procurement takes place, public officials help determine which companies will thrive and which ones will fail. This is one of the important ways governments help create and sustain monopolies in the private sector. But since the bidding process to sell products or services to the government is supposed to be an open and fair competition, how does it become skewed toward businesses that already dominate markets? We examine a particular source of bias: the eligibility criteria for bidding in public procurement tenders. These criteria often allow a few large, private companies to bid on government contracts, but they exclude a large number of small and medium‐sized enterprises. We study the terms by which offers are solicited in India through tenders floated for transportation projects: roads, highways, bridges, and civil construction. We find that the eligibility criteria impose an unnecessarily heavy burden on small firms, potentially knocking them out of the competition and discouraging them from participating in other procurement processes. In this way, the process reinforces monopolies instead of breaking them up. While this study focuses on India, the results also apply to similar economies.

中文翻译：

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政府如何促进垄断：印度的公共采购

政府官员在从私人公司购买商品和服务时发挥着巨大的力量。通过设定进行公共采购的条款和条件，公共官员可以帮助确定哪些公司将蓬勃发展，哪些公司将失败。这是政府帮助在私营部门建立和维持垄断的重要方式之一。但是，由于向政府出售产品或服务的招标过程应该是公开且公平的竞争，因此它如何偏向已经主导市场的企业？我们研究了一种特殊的偏差来源：公开采购招标中的投标资格标准。这些标准通常允许一些大型的私营公司竞标政府合同，但它们却排除了许多中小型企业。我们研究通过在公路，公路，桥梁和民用建筑等运输项目上招标来在印度招揽报价的条件。我们发现，资格标准给小公司带来了不必要的沉重负担，有可能使他们退出竞争并阻止他们参与其他采购流程。这样，该过程将加强垄断而不是将其分解。虽然这项研究的重点是印度，但结果也适用于类似的经济体。可能使他们退出竞争并阻止他们参与其他采购流程。这样，该过程将加强垄断而不是将其分解。虽然这项研究的重点是印度，但结果也适用于类似的经济体。可能使他们退出竞争并阻止他们参与其他采购流程。这样，该过程将加强垄断而不是将其分解。虽然这项研究的重点是印度，但结果也适用于类似的经济体。