We develop a groundwater extraction model that considers the Marshallian inefficiency associated with sharecropping and use data from Pakistan to simulate the impact of an open access regime and of optimal management on groundwater extractions, the state of the aquifer, and annual net benefits through time. We also evaluate a price instrument as a mechanism of inducing optimal extractions. Under both open access and optimal management, we observe notable differences in groundwater extractions and the water table level between the tenure model (which considers the behavior of both owner cultivators and sharecroppers) and the baseline model (which includes the behavior of only owner cultivators). We also find a modest difference in the aggregate net benefits generated by the two models. The results offer new insights—vis-à-vis land tenure heterogeneity—into the evaluation of more effective policies for groundwater management and aquifer sustainability.

我们开发了一种考虑到与农作物种植相关的马歇尔效率低下的地下水开采模型，并使用来自巴基斯坦的数据来模拟开放获取制度和最佳管理对地下水开采，含水层状态以及随时间的年度净收益的影响。我们还将评估价格工具作为诱导最佳提取的机制。在开放获取和最佳管理下，我们观察到权属模型（考虑了所有者耕种者和share耕者的行为）与基准模型（其中包括仅所有者耕种者的行为）之间的地下水抽取和地下水位显着差异。 。我们还发现这两个模型产生的总净收益之间存在适度的差异。