This paper investigates how firms' political capabilities and countries' political structures affect firms' lobbying decision. We use a cross-country, firm-level dataset that covers more than 22,013 firms in 46 countries to discover that a firm's individual- and collective-level political capabilities are positively associated with lobbying. In contrast, the degree of checks and balances among bureaucrats in a country's political market is negatively associated with the firm's possibility of lobbying. Finally, we also find that the positive role of a firm's political capabilities in lobbying is mitigated by the degree of checks and balances among bureaucrats. This study contributes to the literature of corporate political activities by filling the research gaps (1) as considering both horizontal and vertical checks and balances among bureaucrats in political markets, and (2) as simultaneously considering firms' individual and collective political capabilities, by taking one more conceptual step on the literature of contingent dynamic capabilities and lobbying.

本文研究了企业的政治能力和国家的政治结构如何影响企业的游说决策。我们使用涵盖46个国家/地区的22,013家公司的跨国公司级数据集，发现公司的个人和集体级政治能力与游说活动正相关。相反，一国政治市场中官僚之间制衡的程度与公司游说的可能性负相关。最后，我们还发现，官僚之间的制衡程度减弱了公司政治能力在游说中的积极作用。