This article demonstrates for the first time that owners will delegate the location decision under delivered pricing using a relative performance contract rather than a market share contract. It goes on to evaluate the welfare consequences of this demonstration. With linear production costs and simultaneous location, both incentive contracts reduce welfare, but the chosen relative performance contract reduces it by less. Yet, with linear costs and sequential location, the chosen relative performance contract reduces welfare by more. Finally, with enough convexity in production costs, welfare can be improved by the chosen relative performance contracts.

中文翻译：

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交付价格和合同类型的内生委托

本文首次展示了所有者将使用相对绩效合同而不是市场份额合同在交付的价格下委派位置决策。然后继续评估该示威活动的福利后果。在线性生产成本和同时位置的情况下，两个激励合同都会减少福利，但是选择的相对绩效合同会减少福利。然而，由于线性成本和顺序位置，选择的相对绩效合同会进一步减少福利。最后，在生产成本具有足够的凸度的情况下，可以通过选择相对绩效合同来改善福利。