The stability of collusion is compared assuming quadratic transport costs under two spatial pricing schemes, uniform mill pricing and spatial price discrimination. This comparison uniquely allows fully endogenous location choice and examines when two firms collude, when two of three firms collude and when three firms collude. Spatial price discrimination facilitates collusion more than uniform pricing in the first two of the three examinations but not in the third. This heterogeneity argues that the presence of price discrimination by itself does not inform antitrust authorities about the likelihood of collusion.

中文翻译：

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空间定价和串通

在两种空间定价方案，统一工厂定价和空间价格歧视下，假设运输成本为二次方，比较了串谋的稳定性。这种比较独特地允许完全内生的位置选择，并检查两个公司何时会合，三个公司中的两个会合以及三个公司何时会合。在三项检查中的前两项中，空间价格歧视比统一定价更有利于串通，但在第三项中则不然。这种异质性认为，价格歧视本身并不会告知反托拉斯当局串通的可能性。