A bargaining solution satisfies no individual priorities (NIP) if the following holds: if x is the selected utility allocation and \(\pi x\) is also feasible, where \(\pi \) is some permutation, then \(x=\pi x\). I characterize the Nash bargaining solution on the basis of this axiom, non-triviality (the disagreement point is never selected), and scale covariance. An additional characterization is presented for the 2-person case, in which NIP is weakened and symmetry is added.

中文翻译：

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没有个人优先事项和纳什议价解决方案

如果满足以下条件，则讨价还价解决方案不满足单个优先级（NIP）：如果x是选定的效用分配，并且\（\ pi x \）也是可行的，其中\（\ pi \）是某种排列，则\（x = \ pi x \）。我根据这种公理，平凡（永远不会选择分歧点）和规模协方差来刻画纳什议价解决方案的特征。对于2人的情况，还提供了一个附加的特征，其中NIP被削弱并且增加了对称性。