We study a tug-of-war game between two players using the lottery contest success function (CSF) and a quadratic cost (of effort) function. We construct a pure strategy symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium of this game, show that it is unique, and provide closed-form solutions for equilibrium strategies and values. In stark contrast to a model of tug-of-war with an all-pay auction CSF, players exert positive efforts until the very last battle in this equilibrium. We deliver a set of empirically appealing results on effort dynamics.

中文翻译：

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拔河中的坚毅与悬念

我们使用彩票竞赛成功函数 (CSF) 和二次成本（努力）函数研究了两个玩家之间的拔河游戏。我们构造了这个博弈的纯策略对称马尔可夫完美均衡，证明它是唯一的，并为均衡策略和价值提供封闭形式的解决方案。与采用全薪拍卖 CSF 的拔河模型形成鲜明对比的是，玩家在此均衡中的最后一战之前一直在积极努力。我们提供了一组关于努力动态的实证结果。