Based on the analysis of the shortage of emergency rescue services and the supervision of public-private-partnership (PPP) projects, this paper explores the rent-seeking game predicament and establishes a three-player rent-seeking game model among government regulators, private enterprises, and government agents in the bidding operation of PPP projects by learning from Stackelberg game theory. Through the numerical simulation analysis, this paper explores the impact of the relevant variables on the model results, which can lead to the following conclusions: the emphasis on government regulators changes due to rent-seeking cost changes; when the success rate of verification is high, government regulators can take supervision randomly. Inversely, supervision channels should be broadened when the supervision fails. When the punishment on government agents and private enterprises is great, relaxing supervision may be appropriate. This study proposes the relevant policy recommendations for government regulators to improve their work.

中文翻译：

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紧急救援服务的最佳PPP模型

在分析应急救援服务短缺和公私合营项目监督的基础上，探讨了寻租博弈的困境，建立了政府监管机构，民间机构之间的三人寻租博弈模型。 PPP项目的招标运作中，企业和政府机构可以从Stackelberg博弈理论中学习。通过数值模拟分析，本文探讨了相关变量对模型结果的影响，可以得出以下结论：强调因寻租成本变化引起的政府监管者变化；验证成功率高时，政府监管机构可以随机监督。相反，当监督失败时，应拓宽监督渠道。如果对政府机构和私营企业的处罚很大，则放松监管可能是适当的。这项研究为政府监管机构提出了相关政策建议，以改善其工作。