Temporally extended experiences, experiential holists have it, are not reducible to successions of their temporal parts because some whole experiences determine their parts (in some way). This paper suggests, first, that some forms of experiential holism are in fact consistent with the rival atomist view (that experiences are successions of their parts) and, second, that the main reasons advanced for experiential holism are compatible with atomism too. The paper then looks at how holistic determination of its parts by a whole experience might take place in time, arguing that it is either inconsistent or undermines widespread assumptions regarding the mechanisms underlying experiences.

中文翻译：

---

时间上的经验整体论

时间扩展的经验，经验整体论者认为，不能还原为它们时间部分的连续性，因为一些整体经验决定了它们的部分（以某种方式）。本文提出，首先，某些形式的经验整体论实际上与敌对的原子论观点是一致的（经验是它们各部分的连续性），其次，提出经验整体论的主要原因也与原子论相容。然后，该论文着眼于如何通过整体体验对其各部分进行整体确定，并认为它要么不一致，要么破坏了关于体验背后机制的广泛假设。