Using data on more than 13000 European establishments over the 2009–2013 period, we analyze the relationship between discharge regulation and industrial actions. We empirically answer the question as whether stricter dismissal laws make EU establishments experience more frequent and intense industrial actions (work-to-rule, strikes and occupation). We find that a change from employment at-will to a regime with very strict dismissal constraints is associated with an increase in the likelihood of observing an industrial action at the establishment-level ranging between 10.1 and 11.8 percentage points, and that this effect reduces to around 6.5 percentage points when only company-specific industrial actions are considered. A correlation between discharge constraints and industrial actions is found also in a difference-in-differences analysis, where we explore quasi-experimental variations in national dismissal regulations. Although we are not able to establish causality, our findings are suggestive, as they document the possible association between layoff deregulation and the decline of union activism in Europe.

使用2009-2013年期间超过13000个欧洲企业的数据，我们分析了排放法规与产业行动之间的关系。我们凭经验回答以下问题：更严格的解雇法是否会使欧盟机构经历更频繁，更激烈的工业行动（从规则到罢工，罢工和占领）。我们发现，从随意雇佣关系到具有非常严格的解雇约束条件的制度的变化，伴随着在企业级别观察到产业行动的可能性增加，幅度在10.1至11.8个百分点之间，并且这种影响减小到如果仅考虑公司特定的行业行动，则大约为6.5个百分点。在差异分析中也发现了排放限制与工业行动之间的相关性，在这里我们探索国家解雇法规中的准实验差异。尽管我们无法确定因果关系，但我们的发现具有启发性，因为它们记录了裁员放松管制与欧洲联盟激进主义的下降之间可能存在的联系。