Considering the increasing pressure of urban logistics and the demands for better service, express enterprises seek to cooperate to establish joint delivery alliances (JDAs) to increase their profits. The purpose of the paper is to design an incentive model to motivate the members to work at their best and to monitor moral hazard. The moral hazard in a team can prevent a JDA from running normally and continuously and keeping the total benefits maximized. Therefore, this paper highlights the effects of the incentive model concerning moral hazard on increasing more collective benefits and develops an incentive mechanism based on incentive compatibility to rationally allocate the profits among members. A punishment mechanism is designed to monitor and prevent the moral hazard for promoting and sustaining cooperation. Finally, a case study based on express enterprises has been conducted to verify the effectiveness of the incentive model.

考虑到城市物流压力的增加和对更好服务的需求，快递企业寻求合作建立联合交付联盟（JDA）以增加利润。本文的目的是设计一个激励模型，以激励成员尽其所能并监控道德风险。团队中的道德风险会阻碍 JDA 正常持续运行并保持总收益最大化。因此，本文强调道德风险激励模型对增加更多集体利益的影响，并发展基于激励相容的激励机制，以合理分配成员之间的利润。惩罚机制旨在监测和预防促进和维持合作的道德风险。最后，