This paper analyzes implications of network compatibility and competition on process innovation in differentiated network goods duopoly. It shows that firms’ R&D investments are strategic substitutes (complements) if effective network compatibility is less (more) than product substitutability, regardless of the nature of product market competition. If R&D investments are strategic complements, firms always invest in process innovation and they invest more under Bertrand competition than under Cournot competition. If R&D investments are strategic substitutes, unlike Cournot firms, Bertrand firms do not always undertake process innovation; but when Bertrand firms also undertake process innovation, Cournot–Bertrand R&D ranking depends on the strength of network externalities. Presence of R&D spillover improves the case of strategic complementarity of R&D levels under both Bertrand and Cournot competition.

本文分析了网络兼容性和竞争对差异化网络商品双寡头过程创新的影响。它表明，无论产品市场竞争的性质如何，如果有效的网络兼容性小于（大于）产品可替代性，则企业的R＆D投资是战略替代品（补充）。如果研发投资是战略补充，那么企业总是投资于流程创新，并且在伯特兰竞争下的投资要比在古诺竞争下的投资更多。如果研发投资是战略替代品，与古诺特公司不同，贝特朗公司并不总是进行工艺创新。但是当Bertrand公司也进行流程创新时，Cournot–Bertrand的研发排名取决于网络外部性的强度。R＆存在