Financial regulation imposes equity buffers on banks by restricting dividends. This paper studies constrained-efficient dividend policy when banks fund loans with equity and debt. In the model, bank shareholders consider equity costly and a bank’s access to debt depends on its shareholder value. In response to loan losses banks cut dividends, but eventually defer dividends too much. They do not internalize that a commitment to higher dividends (and fewer loans) during recoveries from financial crises would increase shareholder value and access to debt during crises. Constrained-efficient dividends, while restricted during normal times and zero during crises, are higher during recoveries.

金融法规通过限制股息来对银行施加股权缓冲。本文研究了当银行用股权和债务为贷款提供资金时约束有效的股利政策。在该模型中，银行股东认为股本成本高昂，而银行获得债务的方式取决于其股东价值。为了应对贷款损失，银行削减了股利，但最终将股利推迟太多。他们没有内在地认为，在金融危机中追回资金以提高股息（减少贷款）的承诺会增加股东的价值，并在危机期间增加债务的获取。受约束效率的股息在正常情况下受到限制，而在危机期间则为零，而在恢复期间则更高。