This paper develops a stochastic dynamic politico-economic model of sovereign debt to analyze the impact of bailouts on political turnover and sovereign default risk. We consider a small open economy in which the government has access to official loans conditional on the implementation of austerity policies. There is a two-party system in which both parties care about the population’s welfare but differ in an exogenous utility cost of default. Political turnover is the endogenous outcome of the individual voting behavior. In a quantitative application to the Greek economy, we find that bailouts amplify political turnover risk, which, in turn, elevates sovereign interest spreads. While stricter conditionality fosters the probability of political turnover and sovereign default in the short run, it may mitigate political turnover and default risk in the long run. The frequency of political turnover is U-shaped in the strength of conditionality.

本文建立了主权债务的随机动态政治经济模型，以分析纾困对政治周转和主权违约风险的影响。我们认为小型开放经济体中，政府可以在实施紧缩政策的情况下获得官方贷款。在两方制中，双方都关心人口的福利，但是在外在的公用事业违约成本上有所不同。政治更替是个人投票行为的内在结果。在对希腊经济的定量应用中，我们发现，纾困扩大了政治周转风险，进而提高了主权利差。尽管更严格的条件性会在短期内增加政治更替和主权债务违约的可能性，从长远来看，它可以减轻政治失误和违约风险。政治流动的频率在条件性的强度上呈U形。