I construct a novel dataset of individual bankers in the U.S. syndicated loan market to analyze the impact of bankers for the largest, most transparent borrowers. Bankers exhibit time-invariant preferences for specific loan characteristics, or styles. In addition, exploiting within-borrower variation in personal relationship strength from banker turnover, I find that stronger relationships lead to significantly lower interest rates. This effect is stronger if borrowers lack a credit rating or issue less frequent and shorter horizon management reports. Relationship loans are associated with fewer bankruptcies and fewer favorable modifications in renegotiations.

我构建了一个新的银团贷款市场中单个银行家的数据集，以分析银行家对最大，最透明的借款人的影响。银行家表现出对特定贷款特征或风格的时不变偏好。另外，我利用银行内部人员流动的借款人内部人际关系强度的差异，发现更牢固的人际关系会导致利率大大降低。如果借款人缺乏信用等级或发布频率较低且期限较短的管理报告，则这种影响会更强。关系贷款与更少的破产和更少的重新谈判有利条件相关。