This study investigates the implications of earnings management on corporate loan pricing. Through two competing hypotheses (smoothing hypothesis and managerial opportunism hypothesis), we find that both accruals and real activities management are associated with higher loan spreads. Banks view earnings management as a value-destroying process that hampers a borrower’s capacity to repay a loan. Therefore, banks demand a marginal increase in loan spread to compensate for future uncertainty and monitoring costs. Furthermore, we examine the cross-sectional effects of lender reputation and lending relationship. Reputable and relationship banks demand even larger spreads for earnings management, consistent with them identifying and viewing earnings management as a risk-increasing activity. Additional analyses on simultaneity, loan contracting fees, covenant restrictiveness, and propensity matching method show consistent results.

本研究调查了盈余管理对公司贷款定价的影响。通过两个相互竞争的假设（平滑假设和管理机会主义假设），我们发现应计项目和实际活动管理都与较高的贷款息差相关。银行将盈余管理视为破坏价值的过程，阻碍了借款人偿还贷款的能力。因此，银行要求贷款利差略有增加，以补偿未来的不确定性和监控成本。此外，我们研究了贷方声誉和借贷关系的横截面影响。知名银行和关系银行要求盈余管理的利差更大，这与他们将盈余管理识别并视为增加风险的行为相一致。有关同时性，贷款签约费，