I examine how incumbent airlines adjust their departure times in response to the threat of entry by Southwest Airlines. I find that incumbents space their flights more evenly throughout the day when faced with potential entry. This reaction depends strongly on the level of the incumbent’s market share and hub status at the endpoint airports of a market. The evidence suggests that incumbents’ actions are designed to deter, rather than accommodate, entry. I do not find effects on flight frequency, suggesting that incumbents may rely more on the strategic choice of product attributes than on product proliferation to deter entry.

中文翻译：

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进入威胁下的产品规格：来自航空公司出发时间的证据

我研究了现有航空公司如何根据西南航空的入境威胁来调整起飞时间。我发现，当面临潜在的进入时，在职人员整天更均匀地安排他们的航班。这种反应在很大程度上取决于现任运营商的市场份额水平以及市场端点机场的枢纽地位。有证据表明，现任者的行为旨在阻止而不是容纳进入。我没有发现对飞行频率的影响，这表明，在职者可能更多地依靠产品属性的战略选择，而不是依靠产品扩散来阻止进入。