This paper extends the exact equivalence result between the allocations realized by self-fulfilling mechanisms and rational expectations equilibrium allocations in Forges and Minelli (1997) to a large finite-agent replica economy where different replicas of the same agent are allowed to receive different private information. The first result states that the allocation realized by any incentive compatible self-fulfilling mechanism is an approximate rational expectations equilibrium allocation. Conversely, the second result states that, given any rational expectations equilibrium satisfying a “uniform continuity” condition on the equilibrium price, one can construct an approximate incentive compatible self-fulfilling mechanism whose equilibrium allocation coincides with the rational expectations equilibrium allocation for all non-monetary commodities.

本文将自我实现机制实现的分配与Forges和Minelli（1997）中的理性预期均衡分配之间的精确等价结果扩展到大型有限代理复制品经济中，其中相同代理的不同复制品可以接收不同的私人信息。 。第一个结果表明，通过任何激励相容的自我实现机制实现的分配都是近似的理性期望均衡分配。相反，第二个结果指出，给定任何合理的期望均衡，它满足均衡价格上的“一致连续性”条件，