This paper investigates experimentally the effects of communication in distinct games with complete information. We design four games resulting from the interaction between two incentive elements: strategic complementarity and coordination. These incentive elements allow to analyse the use of cheap talk as an efficiency-enhancing and coordinating device. We implement a restricted communication protocol (one-sided, optional, and closed-form) in repeated settings with fixed partners. Our findings provide robust evidence about how cheap talk interacts with incentives to explain strategic behaviour in a dynamic way. As expected, cheap talk increases efficiency under complementarity incentives, and the coordination level under coordination incentives. As novelty, the use of limited communication in repeated interactions has led to identify specific time-varying message profiles as the most effective messages in the coordination games. While the content of messages is explained by the complementarity incentives, faithfulness to credible messages is determined by the coordination incentives.

本文通过实验研究了在具有完整信息的不同游戏中交流的影响。我们设计了两个激励因素之间的相互作用产生的四个游戏：战略互补性和协调性。这些激励因素允许分析廉价谈话作为提高效率和协调的手段的使用。我们在与固定合作伙伴的重复设置中实施了受限的通信协议（单面，可选和封闭形式）。我们的研究结果提供了有力的证据，证明廉价的谈话如何与激励机制互动以动态方式解释战略行为。不出所料，便宜的谈话在互补激励下提高了效率，在协调激励下提高了协调水平。作为新颖性，在重复交互中使用有限的通信已导致将特定的时变消息配置文件识别为协调游戏中最有效的消息。信息的内容由互补激励机制解释，而对可信消息的忠诚度则由协调激励机制决​​定。