We show that ownership by institutional investors with increased incentives to monitor decreases the cost of both public and private debt in the REIT industry. Our study focuses on four types of “incentivized” investors: long-horizon institutional investors, public pension funds, institutions with significant portfolio allocations to particular REITs (motivated institutional owners), and institutional investors that specialize in REITs. In addition, we confirm our findings using a composite index that incorporates only that part of incentivized ownership that is free from the effects of total institutional ownership. Finally, we provide evidence that some of the empirical relationships that we observe can be attributed to monitoring effects and cannot be entirely explained by the intentional selection of REITs with low agency risk into institutional portfolios.

我们表明，机构投资者的所有权随着监控动机的提高而减少了房地产投资信托行业中公共和私人债务的成本。我们的研究关注“激励”投资者的四种类型：长期水平的机构投资者，公共养老基金，对特定REIT具有重大投资组合分配的机构（有动机的机构所有者）以及专门从事REIT的机构投资者。此外，我们使用综合指数证实了我们的发现，该综合指数仅纳入了激励所有权的那部分，而不受机构总所有权的影响。最后，