We study all-pay auctions where each player observes her private value as well as a noisy private signal about the opponent’s value, following Fang and Morris’s (J Econ Theory 126(1):1–30, 2006) analysis of winner-pay auctions with multidimensional private signals. A unique symmetric monotonic equilibrium exists if the signal is not informative enough. When the signal is sufficiently informative, there exists a symmetric non-monotonic equilibrium in which all types of players randomize in overlapping supports. The revenue is lower than that in the standard independent private value setting. Fixing the signal’s informativeness, the all-pay auction raises lower revenue than the second-price auction, whereas the revenue ranking between the all-pay and the first-price auction is ambiguous.

在Fang和Morris（2006年《经济学杂志》理论126（1）：1–30）对获胜者支付拍卖的分析之后，我们研究了全薪拍卖，其中每个玩家都观察到她的私人价值以及关于对手价值的嘈杂的私人信号。与多维私人信号。如果信号不够充分，则存在唯一的对称单调平衡。当信号充分提供信息时，存在对称的非单调平衡，其中所有类型的参与者都在重叠的支撑中随机分组。收入低于标准独立私有价值设置中的收入。固定信号的信息量后，全价拍卖的收入低于第二价拍卖，而全价拍卖和第一价拍卖之间的收入排名却模棱两可。