Does the desirability of social institutions for public goods provision depend on the extent to which they include mechanisms for endogenous enforcement of cooperative behavior? We consider alternative institutions that vary the use of direct punishments to promote social cooperation. In one institution, subjects participate in a public goods experiment in which an initial stage of voluntary contribution is followed by a second stage of voluntary, costly sanctioning. Another institution consists of the voluntary contribution stage only, with no subsequent opportunity to sanction. In a third stage subjects vote for which institution they prefer for future interactions: do they prefer one that does allow sanctions or one that does not allow sanctions? Our results show that even though sanctions are frequently used when available, the clear majority of individuals vote for the institution that does not allow sanctions. Thus, a distinction is required between the principles that guide the choice of institutions and the principles that apply to actions guided by institutions . Our results indicate that it is the wealth generated by the institution that determines its desirability.

中文翻译：

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促进社会合作的制度惩罚机制的内生选择

提供公共物品的社会制度的可取性是否取决于它们在多大程度上包含了合作行为的内生执行机制？我们考虑使用不同的直接惩罚来促进社会合作的替代机构。在一个机构中，受试者参加一项公共产品实验，在该实验中，自愿捐款的初始阶段之后是自愿的、昂贵的制裁的第二阶段。另一个机构仅包括自愿捐款阶段，没有后续的制裁机会。在第三阶段，受试者投票支持他们在未来互动中更喜欢哪个机构：他们更喜欢允许制裁的机构还是不允许制裁的机构？我们的研究结果表明，即使在可能的情况下经常使用制裁，绝大多数人投票支持不允许制裁的机构。因此，需要区分指导制度选择的原则和适用于制度指导行动的原则。我们的结果表明，正是机构产生的财富决定了它的可取性。