A self-regulatory organization (SRO) is a non-governmental organization owned and operated by its members, with the power to create and enforce industry regulations and standards for its members. A key question is whether oversight by an SRO can replace governmental oversight, or whether supplementary governmental oversight is necessary. Using a formal model for the financial sector, and solving simultaneous games, I show that a lack of commitment by the SRO may necessitate governmental oversight of both SRO members and the SRO itself. The core of the model is supported by economics experiments.

中文翻译：

---

自我监管与政府监督：理论与实验研究

自我监管组织（SRO）是由其成员拥有和运营的非政府组织，有权为其成员制定和执行行业法规和标准。一个关键问题是SRO的监督是否可以代替政府的监督，或者是否有必要进行补充的政府监督。我使用金融部门的正式模型并解决同时博弈，表明SRO缺乏承诺可能需要政府对SRO成员和SRO本身进行监督。该模型的核心得到经济学实验的支持。