We provide a version of the Coase theorem within a general equilibrium framework. We consider an economy with other-regarding preferences, and where rights, licenses, or permissions are required to use, consume or transform some specific commodities. These permissions are initially allocated among consumers and, as the commodities, can be costlessly traded. In this scenario, we define different veto mechanisms and the corresponding core solutions that, naturally, result in the same set of efficient allocations. Our final result sets sufficient conditions on preferences and the requirement of rights to ensure that any equilibrium allocation belongs to the core and, in particular, is efficient.

我们在一般均衡框架内提供了科斯定理的一种形式。我们考虑具有其他方面偏好的经济，并且在使用，消费或转换某些特定商品时需要权利，许可或许可。这些权限最初是在消费者之间分配的，并且作为商品，可以无价交易。在这种情况下，我们定义了不同的否决机制和相应的核心解决方案，这些解决方案自然会导致同一套有效分配。我们的最终结果为偏好和权利要求设定了充分条件，以确保任何均衡分配都属于核心，尤其是有效的分配。