offered greater prospects of success – sits uncomfortably alongside the book’s view that Hitler’s quest to conquer Lebensraum was hopeless. If Hitler’s goal was delusional, what sense does it make to say that his strategic or tactical choices were rational or even plausible in that context, especially since Fritz observes that in Hitler’s mind ‘events reinforced his preconceived ideas’ (p. 130), always leading him into flights forward to stave off impending disaster? At the end of November 1941, the senior Nazi engineer Fritz Todt told Hitler that he had to negotiate an end to what had become an unwinnable war, and others advised him similarly afterwards. Instead, he fought on in 1943–1944 in the diminishing hope of somehow stalemating his adversaries and then in 1945 in order to lay the basis through a glorious martyrdom for the resurrection of his ideas at a future date. The latter decision cost the German army more soldiers in each month from January to April than were lost at Stalingrad and more lives in total than in all the battles of 1942–1943 (pp. 343-344), not to mention the toll on the Reich’s civilian population, of whose fate the Führer had washed his hands. Saying that Hitler’s persistence was consistent with his solipsism, as Fritz does in the last two chapters, threatens either to distract readers from such murderousness or to make them see the Nazi leader’s putative ‘rationality’ as deranged. Fritz takes pains to head off either result, but his is a precarious balancing act. That said, students of military history, and of the Second World War in particular, will learn much from this book. The descriptions of campaigns and explanations for their outcomes are cogent and well-reasoned. Fritz’ debunking of postwar pretensions to ‘lost victories’ on the part of Hitler’s surviving generals rings true, if rather unsurprising, and his identification of moments when the Nazi Führer exhibited shrewd military judgement will prompt reconsideration. Above all, readers will come away with an appropriately suspect view of the uppermost ranks of German military leadership during the Second World War.

中文翻译：

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书评：达利和马来亚安全局，1945-48：军情五处与 MSS Leon Comber

提供了更大的成功前景——与本书的观点相吻合，即希特勒征服生活空间的努力是无望的。如果希特勒的目标是妄想，那么在这种情况下说他的战略或战术选择是合理的甚至是合理的又有什么意义，特别是因为弗里茨观察到在希特勒的脑海中“事件强化了他的先入之见”（第 130 页），总是带领他向前飞行以避开迫在眉睫的灾难？1941 年 11 月下旬，纳粹高级工程师弗里茨·托德告诉希特勒，他必须通过谈判结束一场无法取胜的战争，之后其他人也给了他类似的建议。反而，他在 1943 年至 1944 年继续战斗，希望以某种方式使他的对手陷入僵局，然后在 1945 年，为了通过光荣的殉难奠定基础，以便他的思想在未来复活。后一个决定在 1 月至 4 月的每个月中，德国军队花费的士兵比斯大林格勒的损失还多，总的生命比 1942 年至 1943 年的所有战斗（第 343-344 页）还多，更不用说伤亡人数了。帝国的平民百姓，他们的命运被元首洗过手。说希特勒的坚持与他的唯我论是一致的，就像弗里茨在最后两章中所做的那样，可能会分散读者对这种杀戮的注意力，或者让他们看到纳粹领导人假定的“理性”是精神错乱的。弗里茨竭力阻止这两种结果，但他的平衡行为很不稳定。那说，军事史，特别是第二次世界大战的学生将从这本书中学到很多东西。对运动的描述和对其结果的解释是有说服力且有充分理由的。弗里茨揭穿了希特勒幸存的将军们在战后自诩为“失败的胜利”的说法听起来是真的，尽管这并不令人惊讶，而且他对纳粹元首表现出精明的军事判断的时刻的识别将促使人们重新考虑。最重要的是，读者会对第二次世界大战期间德国军事领导层的最高级别产生适当的怀疑。弗里茨揭穿了希特勒幸存的将军们在战后自诩为“失败的胜利”的说法听起来是真的，尽管这并不令人惊讶，而且他对纳粹元首表现出精明的军事判断的时刻的识别将促使人们重新考虑。最重要的是，读者会对第二次世界大战期间德国军事领导层的最高级别产生适当的怀疑。弗里茨揭穿了希特勒幸存的将军们在战后自诩为“失败的胜利”的说法听起来是真的，尽管这并不令人惊讶，而且他对纳粹元首表现出精明的军事判断的时刻的识别将促使人们重新考虑。最重要的是，读者会对第二次世界大战期间德国军事领导层的最高级别产生适当的怀疑。