role in his narrative, often in ways which are entirely absent from both mainstream and academic accounts. Seasons, hours of daylight, tides, visibility, wind, fog, ice, and a host of other factors–along with the lack of sophisticated sensory and navigational aids–made operating warships in the notoriously difficult waters around the British Isles a significant challenge in their own right. This placed a high premium on seamanship, standard operating procedures, and efficiency, with which all sides grappled – with varying degrees of success. These factors were further complicated by a weapon which looms large in Goldrick’s account as having exercised a hitherto under-appreciated influence upon the conduct of naval operations: the automatic mine. The positioning of minefields created profound navigational challenges for all navies, whether they themselves were laying them, or merely hoping to navigate safely around them. They also posed major difficulties in the collation and dissemination of up-to-date information about new fields, the sweeping activities of both sides, and degradation of older mines (older British devices were notoriously unreliable). As one British officer noted, by 1918 ‘much of the water . . . considered innocuous, and . . . gaily careered over at 25 knots, teemed with [mines]’ (p. 262). This exercised a considerable and growing influence upon the operations of all sides, and exerted a degree of attrition upon the light forces whose role it was to lay or sweep these underwater weapons. This highlights an important conceptual point: by shifting the focus away from the battle fleets of each side, Goldrick imparts a vivid sense of the continuous and relentless pace of operations at sea which went on throughout this period. Below the level of the strategic stalemate which existed between the opposing fleets raged a demanding and closely contested operational level conflict, one in which the British (with significant French and American aid) were gaining a clear upper hand by the end of 1918. This book is a must-read for naval historians, but also has much to offer more general scholars of the First World War, students of command, and military practitioners. It is readable, clearly organized, and written with an admirable sense of the challenges under which contemporary navies fought. This does not preclude reasonable critique – Goldrick fairly argues that the Royal Navy was unreasonably slow to produce and adopt an efficient mine, and that it lacked the requisite staff procedures to promulgate effective night fighting and other doctrines. Yet such criticisms are balanced by a keen appreciation of the realities of the time, and a fair-minded account of the numerous developments and innovations which all of the combatants displayed in various ways during the final years of the War. Taken together, Before and After Jutland are now the key accounts of naval operations in European waters between 1914 and 1918.

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书评：西班牙内战：军事史 Charles J. Esdaile

在他的叙述中扮演的角色，通常以主流和学术账户中完全没有的方式。季节、日照时间、潮汐、能见度、风、雾、冰和许多其他因素——再加上缺乏先进的感官和导航设备——使得在不列颠群岛周围臭名昭著的困难水域作战的战舰成为一项重大挑战他们自己的权利。这高度重视航海技术、标准操作程序和效率，各方都在努力解决这些问题——并取得了不同程度的成功。戈德里克认为，一种武器对海军行动的实施产生了迄今为止未被重视的影响：自动水雷，使这些因素变得更加复杂。雷场的定位给所有海军带来了深刻的航行挑战，无论是他们自己铺设它们，还是只是希望在它们周围安全航行。它们还在整理和传播有关新油田、双方广泛活动和旧矿山退化（众所周知的英国旧设备不可靠）的最新信息方面遇到重大困难。正如一位英国军官所指出的，到 1918 年，大部分的水。. . 被认为是无害的，并且。. . 快活地以 25 节的速度航行，布满 [地雷]'（第 262 页）。这对各方的行动产生了相当大且越来越大的影响，并对负责放置或扫掠这些水下武器的轻型部队造成了一定程度的消耗。这突出了一个重要的概念点：通过将焦点从每一方的战斗舰队转移，戈德里克生动地描述了这一时期持续不断的海上行动。在敌对舰队之间存在的战略僵局之下，爆发了一场激烈且竞争激烈的作战层面的冲突，到 1918 年底，英国（在法国和美国的大量援助下）在这场冲突中占据了明显的优势。 这本书是海军历史学家的必读之书，但也为更多第一次世界大战的一般学者、指挥学生和军事实践者提供了很多东西。它可读性强，条理清晰，并且以令人钦佩的方式书写了当代海军所面临的挑战。这并不排除合理的批评——戈德里克公平地辩称，皇家海军在生产和采用高效水雷方面过于缓慢，并且它缺乏必要的人员程序来传播有效的夜战和其他学说。然而，这些批评通过对时代现实的敏锐理解以及对战争最后几年所有战斗人员以各种方式展示的众多发展和创新的公正描述而得到平衡。综合来看，“日德兰之前”和“日德兰之后”现在是 1914 年至 1918 年间欧洲水域海军行动的主要记载。