Theory and empirical research have established that repeated interactions foster cooperation in social dilemmas. These effects of repeated interactions are meanwhile well known. Given these effects, actors have incentives for strategic tie formation in social dilemmas: they have incentives to establish long-term relations involving repeated interactions. Perhaps surprisingly, models accounting for strategic tie formation are scarce. We introduce and analyze a new game-theoretic model that captures the well-known effects of repeated interactions, while simultaneously endogenizing the formation of long-term relations. We assume strict game-theoretic rationality as well as self-regarding preferences. We highlight the commitment feature of tie formation: through establishing a long-term relation, at cost, actors ensure that they would suffer themselves from future sanctions of own opportunism. This allows for mutually beneficial cooperation in the first place. Some extensions of the model are discussed.

中文翻译：

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建立长期交流关系的战略纽带

理论和实证研究已经确定，重复的互动促进了社会困境中的合作。同时，重复相互作用的这些影响是众所周知的。鉴于这些影响，行动者有动机在社会困境中形成战略联系：他们有动机建立涉及重复互动的长期关系。也许令人惊讶的是，考虑战略联系形成的模型很少。我们介绍并分析了一种新的博弈论模型，该模型捕捉了众所周知的重复交互作用，同时使长期关系的形成内生化。我们假设严格的博弈论理性以及自私的偏好。我们强调关系形成的承诺特征：通过建立长期关系，以成本，行为者确保他们自己将来会受到自己机会主义的制裁。这首先允许互利合作。讨论了模型的一些扩展。