Conflict in wage bargaining is affected by information about other bargaining units and information about the past of the bargaining unit. We develop a theoretical framework for such spillovers and detail four distinct mechanisms. Rational learning and social comparisons are reviewed as mechanisms for the influence of information about other bargaining units, and reputation and expectation effects are reviewed as mechanisms for the influence of information about the past of the bargaining unit. Building upon a previous experimental study, we implement an unstructured, time-limited, two-person bargaining game with asymmetric information and investigate the impact of reputation and expectation effects. The experimental treatments vary with respect to spillover-inducing information available to the participants. The results suggest that reputation effects decrease conflict, whereas expectation effects tend to increase conflict. Moreover, reputation effects diminish the influence of social comparisons but can augment the effects of rational learning.

中文翻译：

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工资谈判中的横向和纵向溢出：理论框架和实验证据

工资谈判中的冲突受其他谈判单位的信息和谈判单位过去的信息的影响。我们为这种溢出开发了一个理论框架，并详细介绍了四种不同的机制。理性学习和社会比较被视为其他谈判单位信息的影响机制，声誉和期望效应被视为谈判单位过去信息的影响机制。在之前的实验研究的基础上，我们实施了一个非结构化的、限时的、具有不对称信息的两人讨价还价博弈，并调查了声誉和期望效应的影响。实验处理因参与者可获得的溢出诱导信息而异。结果表明，声誉效应会减少冲突，而期望效应往往会增加冲突。此外，声誉效应会减少社会比较的影响，但可以增强理性学习的影响。